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Abstract
I advance three claims in the paper. The first claim is positive. The Asian and especially the
global financial crisis occasioned meaningful though ad hoc, partial, and uneven discontinuities
in developmental finance and financial governance architecture. The conjunction of
discontinuities and continuities is imparting incoherence to the financial governance architecture
and developmental finance. The second claim is normative. I hold, contrary to the common
narrative, that the emergent incoherence is productive rather than debilitating. In the absence of
an over-arching, coherent model of financial governance EMDEs today are experiencing a
dramatic expansion in policy space and room for institutional experimentation. Especially in
comparison with the stultifying coherence of the neoliberal era, EMDEs enjoy a degree of
autonomy to pursue economic and human development and to introduce reforms that promote
financial stability, resilience in the face of disturbances, and financial inclusion. Emergent
redundancy and networks of institutional cooperation are increasing resilience. The third claim is
that productive incoherence can be understood most fully within a “Hirschmanian mindset,” i.e.,
an understanding of social and regime change informed by Albert O. Hirschman’s key
theoretical and epistemic commitments. The Hirschmanian vision that underpins the paper’s
central theses recognizes that meaningful change can and should come about through the
proliferation of small scale, disconnected, experimental, and incremental adjustments in
institutions and practices that take root in the concrete demands facing policymakers with the
capacity to adjust pragmatically to the changing circumstances and challenges they face.
JEL Codes: F33, F55, O10
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INTRODUCTION
The crises of the 1970s and 1980s generated demands for “South-South” development
institutions that would be largely autonomous from the Bretton Woods institutions (BWIs). In
contrast, the Asian and especially the global crises spawned a new pragmatism reflected in the
view that emerging market and developing economy (EMDE) institutions could complement and
even substitute to some extent for the BWIs. The recent crisis motivated policymakers to
establish entirely new sub-regional, regional, and trans-regional institutions; build out existing
institutions, substantially increasing their funding and capacity; expand their mandates into new
activities; and, in some cases (and with the support of the IMF) explore ways in which these
institutions might link to and coordinate with one another. To date, these developments do not
threaten the BWIs and, indeed, they do not seek to do so. Nor do they pose a potent challenge to
the financial hegemony of the USA and other leading advanced economies (AEs). But, and as I
will argue throughout, displacement is the wrong standard against which to measure their
significance.
One of the most important features of the current period is the extent to which EMDE
policy makers now enjoy and are taking advantage of increasing freedom to act autonomously to
establish new institutions and practices of financial governance and developmental finance. The
willingness and ability of EMDEs to undertake ad hoc and uncoordinated innovation in
institutions that provide long-term project finance and liquidity support--which together
constitute what I refer to as developmental finance--is a crucial legacy of the recent crises.
Innovations in this domain are best understood as uneven, partial, experimental, contested, and
incomplete. And yet, EMDE institutions are evolving in ways that allow them to fill persistent
gaps in the global financial architecture. In short, we find institutional proliferation and
expanding mandates that place the EMDEs at the center of an evolving institutional landscape
marked by complexity, density, fragmentation, pluripolarity, and what I term productive
incoherence and redundancy (on the latter concepts, see Grabel (2011, 2013a, b, 2015, 2017a,
b).1
I advance three claims in the paper. 2 The first claim is positive. The Asian and especially
the global financial crisis occasioned meaningful though ad hoc, partial, and uneven
discontinuities in developmental finance and financial governance architecture. 3 The conjunction
of discontinuities and continuities is imparting incoherence to the financial governance
architecture and developmental finance. The second claim is normative. I hold, contrary to the
common narrative, that the emergent incoherence is productive rather than debilitating.
Especially in comparison with the stultifying coherence of the neoliberal era, EMDEs today are
1

For other treatments along these lines, see Armijo and Roberts (2014), Chin (2015), Fritz and
Mühlich (2014), Helleiner (2010), Helleiner (2016), Huotari and Hanemann (2014), Mittelman
(2013), Rana (2013), Riggirozzi and Tussie(2012), Sohn (2012), Stuenkel (2016), Tussie (2010),
and Woods (2010).
2 The arguments advanced in this paper draw on chapters 2 and 6 of Grabel (2017b).
3 I use the term global financial governance to refer to institutions, arrangements, and policy
practices, while financial governance architecture refers more narrowly to institutions and
networks.
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experiencing a dramatic expansion in the room for institutional experimentation. Emergent
redundancy and new networks of institutional cooperation are increasing resilience.4 The third
claim is that productive incoherence can be understood most fully within a “Hirschmanian
mindset,” i.e., an understanding of social and regime change informed by Albert Hirschman’s
key theoretical and epistemic commitments.
THE HIRSCHMANIAN MINDSET
Hirschman’s seminal insights offer a fresh and extraordinarily useful lens through which to make
sense of the emerging discontinuities and productive incoherence in financial governance
architecture and developmental finance. 5 The Hirschmanian vision that underpins the paper’s
central theses recognizes that meaningful change can and should come about through the
proliferation of small scale, disconnected, experimental, and incremental adjustments in
institutions and practices that take root in the concrete demands facing policymakers with the
capacity to adjust pragmatically to the changing circumstances and challenges they face. For ease
of exposition I corral the central Hirschmanian themes under the categories of agent reactions to
organizational failure; linkages and side effects; epistemic issues; the centrality of the
diminutive, complex, and experimental; and possibilism and futilism.
Agent Reactions to Organizational Failure
Hirschman’s work on exit, voice, and loyalty is his best known and needs little in the way of
exposition. Gerald Helleiner (2010) employs Hirschman’s exit, voice, and loyalty framework to
explain why the Asian and especially the global crisis renewed interest among EMDE
policymakers in ways to escape IMF control through the creation of alternative institutions. The
creation of new institutions also creates opportunities for forum shopping and the development
of relationships that may enhance bargaining power within the BWIs.
Linkages and Side Effects
The basic idea of “backwards and forwards linkages” is straightforward: certain economic
activities can create the propitious conditions for new upstream or downstream economic,
political, or social capabilities (Hirschman 2013[1981]). Hirschman also highlighted the essential
role of “side effects” (Hirschman 1967, 149). For example, a project might establish as an
unintended consequence new networks that turn out to be vital to the project’s success even
though the centrality of the networks was not envisioned at its outset.
Epistemic Issues: Uncertainty and the Power of the “Hiding Hand”
An important theme in Hirschman’s work is the idea that knowledge is incomplete, tacit, partial,
and dispersed. Like Keynes and Hayek, Hirschman took knowledge of the future to be
4

We might also understand these institutions, however small in scale, in terms of their potential
to increase robustness and even what Nassim Taleb (2012) terms “anti-fragility” of the global
financial governance architecture.
5 Grabel (2017b, chap. 2) treats Hirschman’s work extensively.
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fundamentally uncertain (Hirschman 2013[1970]). Following Knight (1971[1921]) and Keynes,
he distinguished between probabilistic risk and (inherently) immeasurable uncertainty
(Alacevich 2014).
The Hiding Hand concept (the capitalization is Hirschman’s) was of course a rhetorical
play on Adam Smith’s invisible hand, and it reflected Hirschman’s recognition that actors always
operate in a state of uncertainty and ignorance (Hirschman 1967). But rather than inhibiting or
distorting action, Hirschman saw uncertainty, ignorance, and error as potential drivers of
productive action by policy entrepreneurs. Underestimating problems propelled projects forward
that would not be initiated in the presence of full information. Once a project is initiated, project
participants are challenged to develop creative solutions to unforeseen problems. The strategies
they devise out of necessity can have positive, lasting spillover effects.
The Centrality of the Diminutive, the Complex, and the Experimental
Hirschman’s epistemic commitments underlay his rejection of social engineering and his
embrace of improvisation in pursuit of multiple development paths. 6 He favored complexity,
messiness, specificity, and contingency in contrast to what he saw as theoretically sanctioned,
paradigm-based uniform solutions.
Hirschman’s epistemic and normative views informed his complex understanding of
social change. He rejected the common tendency to assess ex ante the significance of particular
changes or innovations, a tendency that reflected both a deep-seated skepticism and the epistemic
certainty that dominated social science in his time (and indeed continues to infuse much work
today). In this connection he made an observation that is central to a proper understanding of the
developments considered below.
A distinction is often made between ‘real’ and ‘apparent’ or between ‘fundamental’ and
‘superficial’ changes: This device permits one to categorize as superficial a great number
of changes that have, in effect, taken place and to assert in consequence that there has not
yet been any real change. The decision to assert that real change has occurred is made to
hinge on one or several tests….But to set up such demanding tests is…an indication of a
…reluctance to concede change except when it simply can no longer be denied
(Hirschman 2013[1968], 37).
Hirschman’s commitments led him to embrace the diminutive, which he argued could be
the building block of meaningful, path-dependent reform and widespread change (Adelman
2013, vii-viii, Hirschman 2013[1968], 2013[1970], 2013[1971]). This view of change implied
the need to be open to and welcome the unexpected (Hirschman 2013[1970]) and the related
need for small-scale experimentation, or what Lindblom (1959) termed “muddling through.”

Hirschman’s rejection of top-down social engineering resonates with the work of other critics,
including Hayek (1974), Popper (1971), and Smith (1976[1759], 233-4), and contemporary
critics such as DeMartino (2011, 9-11,17,fns1,5,141-50), Easterly (2008), Ellerman (2005,
2014), McCloskey (1990), and Rodrik (2007).
6
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By now it should be clear that Hirschman was deeply suspicious of what I have termed
coherence, which is predicated on the notion of the social world as a simple social system where
everything fits and where the structure determines what can and cannot work, what is and is not
possible.7 He believed that it was imperative to learn from small-scale, gradual initiatives and
from multiple examples, to recognize uniqueness and the specificity of experiences, and to
appreciate the possibility of a great many sequences rather than to seek universal dictates in a
reductive theory (Hirschman 1965, 1969[1958], 2013[1970], 2013[1971]).8
Possibilism and Futilism
What Hirschman termed “possibilism” entails the idea that small-scale, messy, disparate
innovations reveal what could be, and what reforms might be available. As exemplified in the
concept of the Hiding Hand, possibilism is grounded in faith in the demonstrated capacities of
individuals, institutions, and societies to develop diverse, creative solutions to unforeseen
challenges and development problems. Central to Hirschman’s possibilism is his humility and
his related emphasis on uncertainty—on imperfect, deficient knowledge of what is and what
could be. He counterposed possibilism with the predominant “futilism” in the social sciences—
the view that any initiatives that were not entirely consistent with the precepts of received theory
were bound to fail (Hirschman 2013[1971]).
Hirschman famously said of possibilism that “social scientists often consider it beneath
their scientific dignity to deal with possibility until after it has become actual and can then at
least be redefined as a probability” (Hirschman 1980[1945], xii, emphasis in original). In
reflecting on his own work Hirschman said that “the fundamental bent of my writings has been
to widen the limits of what is or is perceived to be possible, be it at the cost of lowering our
ability, real or imaginary, to discern the probable” (Hirschman 2013[1971], 22).
Lamentable Evaluative Criteria
This selective Hirschmanian tour provides useful guidance when making sense of contemporary
developments in financial governance architectures and developmental finance. This guidance
takes the form of proscriptions that require us to reject evaluative criteria that purport to
determine ex ante or even ex post whether particular policy or institutional innovations are
coherent, viable, sufficient, scalable, and significant.

7

It is striking how much Hirschman anticipates the contemporary emphasis on adaptative,
complex systems.
8 Taking a page directly from Hirschman, Ellerman (2005, 163-65,234-39, 2014) asserts the
importance of fostering parallel experiments (which he sees as necessary for learning under
uncertainty), pooling the experience of actual projects, seeing what works and comparing results,
and promoting cross learning to ratchet up performance of the whole group. Rodrik’s work is
likewise characterized by an embrace of targeted and gradualist policies, practical innovation
over fidelity to a scripted plan, and monitoring and evaluation as strategies to discover what does
and does not work (Rodrik 2007, especially chap. 2, 2011).
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Coherence
We should not vet new initiatives by reference to coherence criteria, adjudicating their viability
based on the degree to which they “fit” into an overarching system. We should instead presume
that any observed institutional innovations within and across countries will conflict to some
degree or other with established institutions, just as existing institutions conflict with each other.
Similarly, we should not be concerned with whether innovations are redundant or duplicative in
some way. Tensions between seemingly inconsistent endeavors might be more apparent than
real, and even real tensions might yield unforeseeable adaptations and innovations that serve to
solve important problems.
Viability
We should not presume to know whether proposed or existing innovations can exist and survive
over the long term, or whether some or all of them are unviable in the context of pressures
emanating from the global economy, the power of global financial actors, or fragilities in
EMDEs. Even those that fail may impart useful lessons that benefit other initiatives. Moreover,
new capacities, knowledge, networks, and coalitions may be built in the context of institutional
innovations even when particular institutional arrangements fail to survive. These Hirschmanian
linkages or side effects may bear fruit in unexpected and unpredictable ways over the medium
and long term.
Sufficiency
We should not be concerned with whether the observed innovations are adequate in the sense of
addressing the full range of needs for developmental finance. They can’t. But then, what can? It
bears emphasis that finding any innovation (or web of interconnected innovations) sufficient
requires utopian thinking where all unintended consequences, contradictions, and perversions are
eliminated by theoretical fiat. That is not Hirschman’s way, and with good reason.
Scalability
We should not judge innovations against the standard of whether they are scalable and even
universalizable (rather than contingent or context dependent) or speculate as to whether they are
doomed to remain small, barely surviving, and even then only in the specific environments
where they have arisen. We should presume instead that scalability is always in part illusory and
aspirational—it is a standard that is often imposed by grand narratives that require homogeneity
and universality on reiterated yet context-specific, diverse constructions. Replicability but with
significant variation is a less ambitious but more achievable goal than scalability—but it may be
a valid objective only if we recognize that replication is a story we employ to make sense of what
may be internally heterogeneous developments.
Significance of Change
Finally, we should not attempt to discern whether innovations represent fundamental or
superficial changes. We must not impose a “test” of fundamental change, such as whether any
5

particular institutional endeavor disrupts the structural power of the IMF or the US. In addition,
we should not dismiss change on the grounds that what appears to be a new development is
simply a repeat of past practices in a new guise. We should presume instead that significance is
always context dependent—that a reiterated construction always represents novelty owing to the
unique circumstances in which it occurs. In addition, we should presume evolution rather than
fixed identities and realize then that significance is revealed only over time in the process of
institutional adaptation. Moreover, we should recognize the need to parse reforms as significant
or insignificant as an urge driven in part by our professional training and the long tradition of
futilism and epistemic certainty that marks it—one we would do well to suppress as we engage a
world that is so much more complex and richer than we can capture adequately through our
various paradigms and predictive models.
Along with Hirschman, we might recognize that each of these criteria constrains our
appreciation of the possible, the ad hoc and the unscripted, and blinds us to the significance and
potential of piecemeal, small-scale initiatives that are now proliferating in EMDEs. It would be
far better to intervene in ways that acknowledge the possibility that each might evolve with the
effect of addressing pressing development problems and deepening capacities, provided they are
not strangled by scientific closed-mindedness that deprives them of recognition, legitimacy, and
support.
A SELECTIVE SURVEY OF ARCHITECTURAL INNOVATIONS IN EMDES
I turn now to the concrete matter of architectural innovations in the financial landscape of
EMDEs as seen through a Hirschmanian mindset. I make no claim for comprehensiveness or
even exploratory depth. Instead, I provide a view from 30,000 feet of a sample of institutions-the evolution of which is emblematic of developments and aspirations elsewhere. (For additional
discussion of these and other institutions, see Grabel (2013a, 2017b, chap. 6) and papers
submitted for consideration in this Development and Change Special Issue.)) The diverse
institutions that I survey below can be corralled under the following framework: capacity
expansion; hybridization; and institutional creation.
Capacity expansion refers to enhancements in the scale of activity of existing institutions.
It is most simply achieved through increased funding by participating governments but also
through new revenue streams, expanded geographical reach, or the introduction of novel
mechanisms or programs toward achievement of traditional or newly identified objectives.
Hybridization can occur purposely, when an institution decides to reach beyond its existing
mission, but also unintentionally, when an institution seeks to maintain its traditional focus but
its actions ultimately blur aspects of the institution’s identity. For instance, a development bank
that traditionally provides project financing might begin to provide counter-cyclical financial
support during a crisis, or its project support might come to play an important counter-cyclical
role during the crisis. Finally, institutional creation involves transformation of proposals or
aspirations into concrete institutions by existing or new parties.
I first consider developments in the realm of reserve pooling across EMDEs. I then
highlight very briefly changes that have transpired in development banking (see Grabel 2017b,
chap. 6). Tables 1 and 2 summarize the results of this survey and anticipate the discussion that
6

follows. Table 1 highlights the chief goals and practices of the institutions and arrangements that
I survey. Table 2 maps their evolution during the global crisis.
[Table 1 here]
[Table 2 here]
Reserve Pooling Institutions and Arrangements
Reserve (also known as liquidity) pooling is initiated for the purpose of providing precautionary
liquidity and/or countercyclical forms of support to members of a pooling arrangement in the
event of currency, liquidity, balance of payments, or contagion pressures.
Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation
In 2000, the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) built on the failed Asian Monetary Fund proposal
(advanced during the East Asian financial crisis) and a 1977 bilateral currency swap agreement
among five Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) central banks. The value of these
commitments increased several times and the arrangement came to include the ten central banks
of ASEAN and the “+3” countries.
The global crisis induced the deepening and expansion of the CMI on two occasions. In
2009, ASEAN+3 finance ministers agreed to “multilateralize” the arrangement, which was
accordingly renamed the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM). Multilateralization
entailed several things. Decisions on disbursing funds from a US$120 billion virtual currency
pool would be made collectively. Multilateralization was reflected in the politically fraught
decision to establish an independent secretariat cum regional surveillance unit, the ASEAN+3
Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), which began to operate in January 2012.
Multilateralization also involves an agreement on voting weights, a matter that was contentious.
Reflecting the power and wealth dynamics of the region, China and Japan have the same voting
weight (and neither alone can veto disbursals), Korea half that weight, and ASEAN countries the
residual.
The link between CMIM support and IMF surveillance has been a matter of controversy
among members from the start (Sohn 2012). For committed futilists the link undermines the
significance of CMIM. But to the extent that the threshold for IMF involvement has been raised
several times (beginning in 2005), and that CMIM and AMRO continue to evolve and deepen
their relationships with regional and transregional bodies, the significance of the IMF link can be
expected to diminish over time.
As the global crisis worsened, CMIM members wrestled with and deepened the
arrangement a second time. In May 2012, the size of the swap pool was doubled to US$240
billion, the maturity of the IMF-linked and delinked swaps was lengthened, and the
arrangement’s original crisis resolution facility renamed. Moreover, the threshold for IMF
involvement (including for the new precautionary line) was raised to 30% in 2012 with a plan to
increase it to 40% (Grimes 2015, 150,fn8). The move to 40% was deferred, and though the
matter was raised during a May 2017 ASEAN meeting. A new Precautionary Line was also
7

introduced in May 2012. It provides support without strict ex ante conditionality to members at
risk of a funding crisis despite what is termed “responsible” macroeconomic and financial
management. Preliminary discussion of disbursal criteria indicates that it would be linked not
just to criteria under the ASEAN+3 “Economic Review and Policy Dialogue Matrix” but also to
reviews of country reports and analyses by AMRO, Asian Development Bank (AsDB), and the
IMF (ASEAN 2016). These measures indicate the institutional cooperation and complementarity
that is an explicit part of the CMIM/AMRO vision.
AMRO is developing in notable ways. AMRO completes a surveillance paper on each
member every year. To date, the IMF has participated in all key AMRO meetings; AMRO has
reached an agreement with the Fund to observe all of its meetings with individual countries;
Fund staff have engaged in “outreach and dialogue” with AMRO (Miyoshi 2013, fn25); and
central bank governors and finance ministers now meet at AMRO. These processes are likely to
enhance the capabilities of AMRO staff to conduct surveillance independent of the Fund. In the
interim this contact could render the IMF-CMIM link more palatable to CMIM members should
AMRO represent member country interests with the Fund in an effective and vigorous manner.
Finally, as an indication of the evolving character of CMIM, members agreed in November 2014
to upgrade AMRO to an international organization.
It would be naïve to imagine that the CMIM will take the place of the IMF in the region.
It is not intended to do so. But this hardly suggests that the CMIM is fated to remain a marginal
player. The key is to recognize complementarities that can enhance the CMIM’s influence and
relative autonomy over time in ways that promote regional financial stability. From this
perspective, for instance, the large national reserves in CMIM countries, alongside CMIM’s
financial resources, increases the capacity and creates productive redundancy in the global and
regional safety nets, with vast potential benefits to global financial resilience. Smaller members
may also benefit from the opportunity for forum shopping during crises that CMIM affords.
Moreover, IMF-linked swaps through CMIM might be associated with adjustment programs that
look substantially different from those negotiated when AMRO officials do not have a seat at the
table with the IMF. If AMRO is ultimately unable to acquire influence over the IMF, CMIM and
AMRO officials might continue to weaken the IMF link.
If the global crisis reveals anything, it is that unexpected developments happen when the
need arises.9 The decisions made in 2009 and 2012 and on-going discussions in CMIM and
AMRO underscore the dynamism of the arrangement and policymakers’ commitment to push its
institutional boundaries gradually. What some have described as a disappointingly slow process
should be recognized as productive when one considers the historical and geopolitical factors
that would seem to doom the enterprise from the start. CMIM is part of an evolving liquiditysupport architecture within which its contributions could be consequential. It is not (yet) intended
to substitute for other institutions, but the learning, trust, bargaining, and socialization by
officials that takes place through CMIM may very well create the conditions for more significant
cooperation and further institutional development in this and other regions during future crises.
The identities and practices of fledgling institutions often evolve in ways that were not
9

Even skeptics note that another crisis may propel further development (Cohen 2012, Grimes
2015).
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anticipated by their founders, especially when they start at a manageable scale and develop in
line with their expanding internal resources and the challenges they confront. There is no reason
to think that CMIM and AMRO are incapable of that kind of development. In fact, they seem to
be evolving along these lines.
The costs of the EU’s failure to address regional surveillance and the Troika’s heavyhandedness were not lost on CMIM members as they deepened the arrangement in 2012. Indeed,
in 2016 a study of “Troika Financial Assistance Programs in the Euro Area for CMIM’s Future
Reference” (ASEAN 2016) was completed under CMIM’s auspices. In addition, in 2016, CMIM
and AMRO conducted “test runs” under various scenarios of the IMF delinked and linked
portions of CMIM funds. The test revealed important inadequacies, which are now being
addressed.10 These initiatives indicate that CMIM and AMRO continue to deepen their capacities
in the post-crisis context. Moreover, CMIM’s structure and procedures have been watched
closely by Latin American policymakers (AsDB/IADB 2012) and inspired the 2014 decision by
the BRICS to launch a similar initiative. Moreover, representatives from AMRO, European
Stability Mechanism, the Latin American Reserve Fund, the Arab Monetary Fund, the BRICS,
the Eurasian Development Bank, the G-20, and the IMF met for the first time on the sidelines of
the fall 2016 meetings of the IMF-World Bank to discuss cooperation (AMRO 2016). These now
annual meetings suggest increased cooperation, the deepening of networks, and the gradual
emergence of an increasingly complex financial architecture across the globe.
Latin American Reserve Fund
The Andean Reserve Fund was founded in 1978. In 1988 the organization changed its name to
the Latin American Reserve Fund (Spanish acronym FLAR) when it decided to admit nonAndean nations. It is designed to respond to transitory liquidity issues in member states. In the
event of more enduring structural problems, the FLAR may provide “bridge finance” while a
member seeks support from another institution.
The FLAR maintains five credit facilities, including a contingency loan facility.
Contingency loans provide precautionary access to funds to address internal or external shocks
and do not involve prequalification. The FLAR has eight members. 11 FLAR capital comes
primarily from capital subscriptions by member central banks, though it issued bonds in 2003
and 2006. As of April 2017, the FLAR had subscribed capital of US$3.9 billion, of which
US$2.8 billion is paid-in.
Each FLAR member is assigned one vote. A supermajority (and variants on it) is required
for certain types of key decisions. FLAR lending is not linked to the IMF. This fact and the
FLAR’s equitable voting system contribute to its legitimacy among members. There has never
been a default on a FLAR loan.
The FLAR has deepened its surveillance capabilities over time. Since 2011, the FLAR
has had a macroeconomic monitoring unit, the Division of Economic Studies, which reviews and
10
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Members are Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Paraguay, Perú, Uruguay, and
Venezuela.
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monitors member performance and economic prospects. A central bank seeking balance of
payments support or external debt restructuring is required to present to the FLAR executive
president a written report on how it will mitigate the problem that motivates the support request.
A decision on whether to grant support is then made by the non-resident Board of Directors
following consideration of the remediation program by the Division of Economic Studies. To
this point, the FLAR has not denied support on the basis of the plans presented, and has
generally not required additional adjustment measures beyond those proposed by a central bank
requesting support (Velarde 2015, 150).12 Hence, there is no conditionality in the traditional
(IMF) sense.13 But as part of its loan contract, the borrowing country agrees not to impose
measures that affect the imports from another FLAR member as part of its balance of payments
restructuring process (Rosero 2014, 46). Division of Economic Studies staff assess the balance of
payments situation and repayment capacity of countries receiving support (Titelman et al. 2014,
fn28). Staff may also make technical visits to the country’s institutions and require reports to the
FLAR’s executive president and board (ibid.). The review is expedited in the case of short-term
support since the executive president approves these requests without involvement of the Board
of Directors (Rosero 2014, 65).
Over its lifetime (and through September 2016), the FLAR has made 47 disbursements,
amounting to roughly US$6.4 billion (Mühlich and Fritz 2016). The FLAR has lent to all of its
members except Uruguay and Paraguay. In some cases the FLAR contributed stabilizing
resources when the IMF did not, or when members declined to engage the Fund (Ocampo and
Titelman 2012). Though FLAR resources are relatively small in the aggregate, they are
significant relative to the needs of smaller member states, and lending has been redistributive
subregionally (Ocampo and Titelman 2009-2010, 262). Mitigation of balance of paymentsinduced crises in smaller members has benefited the region’s other economies by stabilizing
trade flows (Kawai and Lombardi 2012), as has the requirement that borrowing countries not
interfere with intra-FLAR trade. The FLAR’s presence reduces the pressure on smaller countries
to accumulate reserves and hence the opportunity cost of doing so (Eichengreen 2010). The
FLAR has provided important savings to members by making funds available at better terms
than are available on international markets to countries under stress (Rosero 2014). In some
instances, FLAR resources have been leveraged as part of broader support programs. FLAR
membership has also been beneficial to members since reserves committed to it have yielded
greater returns than those maintained in national reserve portfolios (Perry 2015, 27).
In terms of lending, the FLAR largely maintained rather than expanded its role during the
global crisis. This reflects Latin America’s relative vitality during the crisis rather than any
failure on the part of the FLAR. During the global crisis the FLAR received and acted on
requests for assistance from only two members (Ecuador and Venezuela).
Looking beyond lending as a metric of change, we find evidence of gradual FLAR
evolution during the global crisis and up to the present. Membership broadened, with Uruguay
joining in 2009 and Paraguay in 2015. In 2015 Guatemala and the Dominican Republic were
formally invited to begin the process of accession (FLAR website, annual report 2015,25). FLAR
members approved a 40% increase in subscribed capital in 2012 (Titelman et al. 2014, fn9).
12
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The only exception involved loans to Ecuador (2005, 2009) (Rosero 2014, 75).
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Uruguay and Costa Rica pre-paid their entire subscribed capital in 2011 and 2015, respectively;
Paraguay increased its paid-in capital in 2015, and in the same year, Costa Rica doubled its
subscribed capital (Ocampo 2015, 160). In recent years, the FLAR has begun to play a more
important role in improving the investment conditions of members’ reserves, giving it a role as a
regional financial intermediary (Ocampo 2015, 160). In addition, after more than a decade of
dialogue, the FLAR and the IMF agreed to allow a portion of the capital paid-in to the FLAR to
count towards their international reserves with the IMF (FLAR website, annual report 2015,27).
This double counting reduces the cost of FLAR membership for new (especially small)
economies.
The FLAR is insufficiently capitalized to respond on its own to the needs of larger
economies, especially during crises that affect several members simultaneously. The recent
inclusion of and invitations to smaller economies is indicative of an interest in membership
expansion. But the absence of some of the region’s largest economies necessarily limits the
capacity of the institution. Observers have consequently argued for broadening its membership
and deepening its resources, not least through establishing contingent credit lines with member
central banks and private banks, intermediating funding from or cooperating with the IMF
(Rosero 2011, 2014), and connecting it with other sub-regional, regional, and multilateral
institutions (Ocampo and Titelman 2012). Even if expanded, institutions like the FLAR should
be viewed as complementary insurance mechanisms that are part of a global patchwork of
financial cooperation. In extreme cases, the IMF could leverage FLAR capital to mobilize a
larger pool of resources, or the FLAR could take action in conjunction with other regional
institutions (Titelman et al. 2014, 17). We might envision a capacity-based division of labor in
which regional mechanisms like the FLAR provide support to small- and medium-sized
countries and act independently during localized economic disturbances—something it has
already done—while the IMF provides support to large countries and partners with the FLAR
during large-scale crises, though without IMF-driven conditionality (as per Ocampo 2006a,
2015, 170).
The FLAR has pursued “strategic alliances” with a range of other institutions, including
AMRO, the Development Bank of Latin America, and the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS). The result is an emerging cross-cutting network of cooperation that stands to enhance the
capacity of these partners while generating cross-institutional learning.
Arab Monetary Fund
The Arab Monetary Fund (ArMF) was founded by central bankers from the Arab world and
began operating in 1977. Today it has 22 members and a small amount of subscribed capital,
approximately US$3.8 billion as of the end of 2016.14 As with the FLAR, the ArMF takes
deposits from member central banks and has a broad developmental and financial stability remit.
The ArMF can borrow from members and from Arab and foreign institutions and markets, and
can issue securities.
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The ArMF has several lending facilities. Since 2009 a facility supports countries facing
short-term liquidity problems caused by difficulties accessing international financial markets.
ArMF loans have varying access limits and are disbursed with varying degrees of oversight. The
institution appears from the one relevant study to be extraordinarily nimble. McKay, Volz, and
Wölfinger (2011, 21) report that some types of loans, such as those available under the new
short-term liquidity facility and what are termed automatic balance of payments loans, are
disbursed very quickly and carry no requirement of a country mission or conditionality.
Management makes a decision following rapid preparation of an internal report, with later
notification to the Executive Board (see also Mühlich and Fritz 2016, 15). Other types of loans
are generally approved in one to six weeks, require an adjustment program agreed to by the
member state and the ArMF, and supplementary support from other regional and multilateral
institutions, such as the IMF(Corm 2006, McKay, Volz, and Wölfinger 2011, 21). Conditions on
ArMF loans tend to be less stringent than those associated with the IMF (Corm 2006, 309,
UNCTAD, 2007,122, UNCTAD 2015, 74).
The ArMF has a technical staff that observers consider highly competent (McKay, Volz,
and Wölfinger 2011, Miyoshi 2013). Staff members conduct reviews of member country
economic conditions and financing needs (ibid.). However, some analysts question whether
monitoring is sufficiently stringent (McKay, Volz, and Wölfinger 2011), though loan arrears
remain small and concentrated in countries facing difficult political and social conditions (e.g.,
Somalia, Syria, and Sudan).
The ArMF’s governance structure is not unlike that of the BWIs (and the main regional
development banks, MRDBs). Decisions of the eight-member Executive Board are by absolute
majority, with votes weighted by size of member contribution. Three countries (Saudi Arabia,
Algeria, and Iraq) together hold 38.5% of the votes. That these countries are overrepresented
underscores the point that governance of EMDE regional institutions is not inherently more
egalitarian than that of the BWIs.
From its establishment through the end of 2015, the ArMF has made 174 loans to 14
member nations totaling US$8.2 billion. 15 Average drawing volume tends to be very small, and
smaller, oil-importing members have been the most frequent users of lending facilities
(especially in the 1980s) (Mühlich and Fritz 2016). The ArMF was faced with growing demands
on its resources stemming from the challenge of the global crisis, the Arab Spring, and rising
food and falling oil prices. During 2009 the ArMF made five loans totaling US$470 million via
its new short-term liquidity facility. Between 2009 and 2015, the institution approved a total of
33 loans to eight countries totaling US$3.5 billion. Moreover, the dollar value of loans extended
during each year of the period 2009-2013 exceeded that for any other year (except 1988) since
the institution began to operate. The US$800 million in loans extended in 2015 represents a new
peak for the institution.
The ArMF has no formal relationship with the IMF. The IMF has provided technical
assistance to the ArMF on domestic bond market development (Rhee, Sumulong, and Vallée
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2013). The ArMF also coordinates with the IMF on technical workshops (ArMF website, annual
reports, table B-2) and took part in regular meetings of the IMF and World Bank during 2015.
The institution’s Articles of Agreement charge it with providing “complementary” lender of last
resort financing for some types of loans(Miyoshi 2013, 31-2). This explicitly complementary
role is necessitated by the ArMF’s small capitalization and is reflected in the frequent parallel
use of the IMF and ArMF. Since its creation, parallel use has occurred on 22 occasions, mostly
during the Arab Spring (Mühlich and Fritz 2016, 23). The ArMF’s resources and lending could
obviously be increased significantly to provide more support to its poorer members, given the
vast assets possessed by some of its oil-exporting members.
Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development
The member countries of the Eurasian Economic Community created the Eurasian Fund for
Stabilization and Development (EFSD) in June 2009. Since its founding the fund has operated as
a hybrid that involves features of reserve pooling and development banking. The EFSD serves as
a regional safety net that extends what it terms financial credits to governments to offset the
effects of the global crisis; funds stabilization programs by supporting budgets, balance of
payments, and currencies; and ensures the long-run economic stability of member nations. The
EFSD also provides what it terms investment loans to governments and firms for large interstate
projects that support regional integration or national investment and has a new program of grants
aimed at supporting social programs.
The EFSD was established with subscribed contributions of US$8.5 billion by six
countries.16 As of December 2016 the EFSD has paid-in capital of US$3.05 billion, most of
which comes from Russia, its largest member. Paid-in contributions to the EFSD come from
pooled member resources via budget contributions. At present it has no capacity to issue bonds
or to otherwise tap financial markets (Rhee, Sumulong, and Vallée 2013). Votes at the EFSD are
weighted by capital contributions (as per the ArMF, the BWIs, and the MRDBs). Russia holds
85% of the votes and consequently holds veto power.
The Eurasian Development Bank manages EFSD resources and conducts surveillance of
EFSD borrowers (Rhee, Sumulong, and Vallée 2013, 224). There are no automatic disbursals of
financial credits from the EFSD, and all disbursements are tied to a heavily and regularly
monitored adjustment program. Financial credits are followed by consultations intended to
determine the likelihood of borrower success in implementing reforms or stabilization programs
that are funded by the EFSD. Recipients are not required to work with the IMF, though the
EFSD claims that it is “guided” by the IMF in matters relating to financial credits. It also uses
IMF benchmarks when assessing various matters, such as corporate governance. Indeed, an
EFSD annual report notes that the manager “consulted with the IMF on a regular basis regarding
economic policy guidelines for Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan,” and that
EFSD officials have been discussing coordination initiatives with the AsDB, World Bank, and
IMF since 2014 (EFSD website, annual report 2014,12). The EFSD does not extend financial
credits to countries that are in arrears to the IMF, other multilateral institutions, or EFSD
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members. However, in the case of Belarus, the EFSD extended a financial credit to the country
when the IMF declined to do so. Decisions on financial credits by the EFSD are rapid—available
evidence suggests that internal decisions on loan disbursements are made in two to eight weeks
(Mühlich and Fritz 2016, 15).
To date, the EFSD has extended only four financial credits totaling almost US$3 billion
(to Tajikistan in 2010 and 2016, Belarus in 2011, and Armenia in 2015). Its largest extension of
financial credits to date was to Belarus—its support package of US$2.6 billion was equal to
almost 6% of the country’s GDP. The 2010 support package of US$70 million to Tajikistan was
equal to about 1% of its GDP. The case of Belarus suggests that EFSD surveillance has teeth:
disbursal of a sixth tranche of funding was postponed from 2013 to 2015 because the country
missed stabilization targets established in its agreement with the EFSD. Support was
reestablished in 2016.
The Contingent Reserve Arrangement of the BRICs
Since 2011, the BRICS has moved rapidly to develop plans and launch initiatives to create new
financial institutions. The first BRICS-level financial initiative was launched in March 2012
when the five founding members of the BRICS Exchanges Alliance began cross-listing
benchmark equity index derivatives. Plans for financial cooperation became more ambitious in
2012, when the group began to discuss formation of a development bank that would supplement
existing institutions. In 2012, BRICS finance ministries also agreed to encourage trade between
members, denominated in bilateral currencies. 17
Intra-BRICS cooperation took a step forward at the July 2014 Leaders’ Summit in
Fortaleza, Brazil. In what became known as the Fortaleza Declaration, the group announced that
it had reached agreement on two initiatives—the founding of a reserve pooling arrangement
called the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) and the New Development Bank (NDB).18
Long-standing frustration with the BWIs was explicit in the Fortaleza Declaration, which stated
that “International governance structures designed within a different power configuration show
increasingly evident signs of losing legitimacy and effectiveness” (BRICS 2014a).
Notwithstanding these frustrations, the declaration also made clear that both the CRA and the
NDB were to be complements to and not substitutes for the BWIs.
The CRA is a reserve pooling arrangement meant to provide liquidity protection
(including precautionary support) through currency swaps to members during balance of
payments crises.19 China has pledged US$41 billion to the CRA’s US$100 billion pool; Brazil,
India, and Russia have each pledged US$18 billion; and South Africa has pledged US$5 billion.
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Pledges by China, Brazil, India, and Russia to the CRA are nearly equal to each of their IMF
quotas. No single member is to have effective veto power over fundamental changes in the CRA.
As of this writing, the criteria to be used in decisions pertaining to qualification for support under
both the liquidity and the precautionary facilities are still under development. Support decisions
will be made by a “Standing Committee” comprising five directors appointed by each of the
member country central banks. Countries applying for support from the CRA (including for
precautionary support) in amounts above 30% of their eligibility must be in compliance with the
surveillance and disclosure obligations of the IMF’s Article IV (sections 1 and 3) and Article
VIII (section 5), and they may not be in arrears to BRICS nations or to regional or multilateral
institutions (Henning 2016, 125-6, BRICS 2014b, Article 14(b)(v)). The most controversial
aspect of the CRA rests precisely in the decision to replicate the CMIM-IMF link.
It is unrealistic to treat the BRICS as a serious challenge to the roles of the US and the
IMF in global financial governance. Instead, it should be seen as a group that occupies an
“intermediate space” in global interstate power (Armijo, Katada, and Roberts 2015, Armijo and
Roberts 2014), and as creating a “parallel order” rather than one that rivals the United States and
the BWIs (Stuenkel 2016, Chin 2015). That said, the BRICS group has often had to overcome or,
more accurately, work around important differences and persistent fissures to reach consensus.
The launch of the CRA triggered an avalanche of commentary that broke down along the
lines of Hirschman’s possibilists and futilists. Futilists dismissed the “empty symbolism” of the
CRA, emphasizing the decision to replicate the CMIM-IMF link, the small size of CRA
resources relative to potential demands, and the dollar-based funding commitments to the CRA
that reinforce the currency’s dominant global role. 20 More broadly, skeptics emphasize what they
see as fatal internal tensions that will continue to disrupt the group’s cohesiveness and its
potential to transform financial governance. 21 Others emphasize the “sub- or neo-imperial”
tendencies of the BRICS while still others dismiss the significance of the BRICS, particularly as
growth prospects have slowed. 22
Possibilists are not persuaded. In the possibilist view, the CRA (warts and all) is part of
an evolving, fragmenting global financial landscape in which institutional experimentation is
becoming the “new normal.” From this perspective, the CRA is understood to complement
existing institutions and advance the growing disbursal of economic power while holding the
potential to increase the voice of EMDEs in the global financial governance architecture either
directly or through the leverage associated with forum shopping. 23 For possibilists, the CRA is
one among many parallel experiments that provide opportunities for learning, problem solving,
and deepening networks of influence. Surely the impact of the BRICS and their various
initiatives will be uneven and even contradictory, reflecting enduring tensions within each of its
member states, among its members, and between those members and other actors (states and
institutions). But that is equally true of all complex institutions and their endeavors—they are not
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adequately described by exclusive reference to their formal mission statements or just one aspect
of their practice.
It is also true that critical issues (such as China’s voice at the CRA and the relationship
between the CRA and the IMF) must be addressed before the CRA begins to disburse funds.24
But these obstacles are not insurmountable, and the motivation to overcome them is high. There
is good reason to expect that the CRA will ultimately develop independent, well-resourced, and
technically competent surveillance capacity over time, and as that occurs, the IMF link may
lessen or be eliminated. For these reasons, the CRA carries significant potential to catalyze
widespread change through its own internal performance, through competition or cooperation
with other pooling arrangements, and through the example it sets for other institutions (GriffithJones, Fritz, and Cintra 2014).
Development Banks
Development banks in EMDEs (and the MRDBs) were created over fifty years ago to address
the shortage of project and infrastructure finance. The inadequate provision of infrastructure
financing remains a critical deficiency of the global financial architecture (Chin 2014). In the
context of the global crisis, the World Bank, the MRDBs, and some national, subregional, and
regional development banks based in EMDEs took on roles that we traditionally associated with
institutions that focus on liquidity support. Development banks introduced and, where such
facilities previously existed, significantly increased disbursements of shorter-term loans and
other forms of financing (such as trade credits) that had counter-cyclical effects. Indeed, a World
Bank survey of 90 development banks across the world highlights the important and often
overlooked counter-cyclical impact of these institutions (de Luna-Martínez and Vicente 2012).
The terrain of development banks is vast and far better known than that of reserve pooling
arrangements. For this reason, and for reasons of space, the discussion of development banks is
brief and highlights salient discontinuities.
Development Bank of Latin America
The Development Bank of Latin America (formerly, the Andean Development Corporation;
Spanish acronym CAF) was launched in 1970 to support development and integration of the
Andean Community countries.25 Its membership and the focus of its loan programs have
broadened considerably over time.
Almost half of CAF-approved disbursements from 2010 to 2015 were in the form of
medium- and long-term loans. This lending was particularly important insofar as funds for
longer-term project finance in EMDEs contracted severely as private lenders fled these markets
during the global crisis. CAF finance has important counter-cyclical and developmental impacts
since it provides stable funding to members. CAF financing dampened instability during the
EMDE financial crises of the 1990s and the global crisis, when CAF loans remained high. In
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2015, the CAF increased its countercyclical activity through what it called fast disbursing and
contingent operations of US$2.4 billion. In 2015, the CAF approved a record volume of loans of
US$12.3 billion (and disbursed US$5.9 billion).
Member nations’ commitment to the CAF is apparent in the ease with which the
institution raised capital from its members during the global crisis. One might have expected
national policymakers to withdraw from multilateral commitments. Instead, shareholders quickly
and unanimously approved a US$2.5 billion paid-in capital increase in August 2009 (Humphrey
2014). In 2015 CAF shareholder countries again approved an increase in paid-in capital (of
US$4.5 billion) (CAF, annual report).
The CAF issues a large percentage of bonds in Latin American currencies, which are held
by regional and international investors. During the global crisis, the CAF introduced and utilized
two new financial products to support infrastructure finance, “Collateralized Infrastructure Debt
Obligation,” a securitized debt obligation for which infrastructure loans serve as collateral, and
“Debt Funds for Infrastructure.” The latter were used in Colombia in 2014 (issued in Colombian
pesos and indexed to inflation) and Uruguay in 2016 (issued in Uruguayan pesos and dollars, and
also indexed to inflation). Local currency bonds reduce locational mismatch and promote the
development of local currency bond markets, something that has positive side effects in terms of
financial resilience, stability, and access to long-term credit. The CAF has also signed
cooperative agreements with the Green Climate Fund and the Global Environment Facility,
reflecting an increasing emphasis on sustainable financing.
The New Development Bank
The NDB is designed to finance investment in infrastructure projects and more sustainable
development (including sustainable infrastructure) in the BRICS, with an eye toward allowing
other low- and middle-income EMDEs to buy in and apply for funding in the future.
The NDB approved its first loans in May 2016. By year-end 2016 it had approved a total
of seven loans, collectively amounting to US$1.5 billion. Each of its member nations was
approved for one of its first five loans, and an additional two loans were approved later for China
and India. The loans were extended to public sector entities in each of the countries to support
small-scale renewable energy and transportation-related projects, and were financed by “green”
RMB-denominated bonds issued in the Chinese market. As of November 2016, the institution
reported that it had received approval from member governments to develop local currency bond
offerings in the Indian, Russian, and South African markets (NDB 2016a, b). In August 2017 the
bank approved another tranche of loans, totaling US$1.4 billion.
Some analysts suggest that NDB loans could dwarf those of the World Bank in the next
several decades, especially if membership is broadened and the institution co-finances loans with
governments and private investors.26 In terms of co-financing possibilities, the NDB signed
memoranda of understanding with the CAF and the World Bank in September 2016, and with
Discussion of the NDB’s significance break down along familiar futilist and possibilist lines
(see citations in Grabel (2017b, chap. 6)).
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Brazil’s National Bank of Economic and Social Development (BNDES) in April 2017. The
NDB’s loan portfolio capacity is projected to reach about US$45-65 billion by 2025(Humphrey
2015, figure 5).
Initiatives Led by China: The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Belt and Road
Initiative/Silk Road Fund
Simultaneous with its involvement in BRICS initiatives, the Chinese government has created an
ambitious new institution, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the equally
ambitious “Belt and Road” initiative, and at least 13 regional or bilateral funds that will radically
increase Chinese development and infrastructure finance abroad (Gallagher, Kamal, and Wang
2016, 1). The Silk Road Fund is one of the 13 new funds. Taken together, the funds are projected
to contribute up to US$116 billion in project financing (Gallagher, Kamal, and Wang 2016, table
1). It is clear that China is “poised to be the largest development [and infrastructure] lender in the
world” (Gallagher, Kamal, and Wang 2016, 1).
In its first year of operation, 2016, the AIIB approved nine projects across seven
countries, totaling US$1.7 billion. All but one of these loans is to be co-financed with legacy
institutions. In terms of capitalization and number of members, the AIIB represents the largest of
China’s contributions to the changing institutional landscape. Chinese officials, along with those
of the IMF, World Bank, and AsDB, have made it clear that they see the AIIB as complementary
to legacy institutions (McGrath 2015). The decision by the US and Japan not to join suggests that
they see it differently.
By 2025, the AIIB is conservatively projected to have a loan portfolio capacity of
US$70-90 billion (Humphrey 2015, 15). Under less conservative scenarios its loan portfolio
could reach US$100-120 billion or more, making it the second-largest development bank in the
world (Griffith-Jones, Xiaoyun, and Spratt 2016, 26). The AIIB will largely co-finance projects
with other multilateral lenders in its first years of operation. With cofinancing, the scale of the
infrastructure projects to which the AIIB contributes could reach US$240 billion by 2025 (ibid.).
Many legacy institutions have signed cooperative agreements with the AIIB.
The China-led initiatives express the foreign policy ambitions and economic objectives of
China’s leadership. The China-led initiatives and the creation of the NDB should be understood
both as a response to the vast need for infrastructure spending and finance and as a reflection of
long-standing frustrations about the governance of the BWIs. 27 Taken together, these initiatives
are apt to have catalytic effects on the World Bank and the AsDB (and other MRDBs) (e.g., see
Chin (2014)). As Kozul-Wright and Poon (2015) note, China’s experience with experimental and
incremental development strategies make it particularly suited to take on this leading role in
transforming the institutional landscape of development banking. China’s initiatives also
increase the possibility for forum shopping, with attendant effects on voice in existing
institutions. The Chinese initiatives have already placed and will likely continue to place
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pressure on the private sector, the G-20, the World Bank, and the MRDBs to increase
infrastructure spending.
The BNDES and the China Development Bank
Under Brazil’s President Lula da Silva, BNDES began to provide countercyclical finance.
During the global crisis BNDES increased disbursements, coordinated actions with private banks
to support distressed firms, and took other measures to channel liquidity to small and mediumsized banks that were under stress (Armijo 2017, Torres Filho 2011). It played a critical role in
providing financing when private domestic lenders in Brazil contracted their operations in 2008
and all but froze lending from September 2008 to January 2010 (Chandrasekhar 2016, Torres
Filho 2011). The expansion of public credit was central to the country’s ability to emerge from a
recession after only a six-month downturn, and to the stability of manufacturing in the face of a
16% fall in exports from September 2008 to March 2009 (Hochstetler and Montero 2012).28 In
recent years BNDES has begun to cooperate with other multilateral and regional development
banks, such as the World Bank and, as part of its continuing engagement with the BRICS, with
the national development banks of China, India, Russia and South Africa and the NDB.
The CDB is the world’s largest development bank in terms of assets, which remained
high and grew steadily during the global crisis. The CDB undertook strongly countercyclical
initiatives during the crisis by lending actively in the domestic market and providing important
support for the country’s export performance. Lending by the bank grew markedly: at year-end
2008, outstanding loans were valued at US$460 billion, and at year-end 2014, they stood at
US$1.2 trillion. The loans extended in 2014 were valued at US$276 billion, which represented a
20% increase over 2013 lending (CDB website, annual report-2014,12). As signs of an economic
slowdown and financial fragility became apparent during the summer and fall of 2015 the CDB
responded with new counter-cyclical support that supplemented other government measures.
During the crisis China launched a variety of bilateral financial initiatives in EMDEs through its
policy banks, especially the CDB, but also through the Export-Import Bank. At year-end 2015,
the CDB’s foreign currency loans totaled US$276 billion, which represented 19% of its total
loan portfolio and a ninefold increase in foreign-currency lending compared with 2007 (CDB
website, annual report-2015,60). Many of these loans support infrastructure development in
EMDEs and China’s access to raw materials (UNCTAD 2015, 169-70).
Lending by China and other emerging powers is imparting complexity to the traditional
Bretton Woods-era architecture of project finance, when the line between AE lending and EMDE
borrowing was clearly drawn.
A Caveat Regarding Africa and a Venezuelan-led Initiative
Neither the Asian nor the global crisis has had a major catalytic effect on institutions of
developmental finance on the African continent. The only meaningful outcomes in this regard
It is uncertain whether BNDES will continue to play a central role in Brazil’s economy, given
the unsettled state of economic and political conditions, scandals that have damaged the
institution, and the current government’s decided tilt toward the market.
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relate to South Africa’s role in the CRA and the NDB, its membership in the AIIB, and the
activism of the AfDB. 29 This stands in contrast to the effects of these crises elsewhere in the
global south and east, as we have seen. This type of unevenness is to be expected—indeed, it is
part and parcel of the overall inconsistency at the heart of the emerging financial architecture.
Where we have seen more meaningful steps toward financial architectural innovations in Africa
is in the realm of regional macroeconomic coordination and monetary integration, where several
sub-regional initiatives are in the planning stages (see Fritz and Mühlich 2014, 29-40).
A (largely) Venezuelan-led initiative to create a development bank, the Bank of the South
(Spanish acronym, BDS), is worth noting briefly because it illustrates the fragility of institutional
experimentation. The initial BDS vision entailed the principles of equal voice among members
and the rejection of conditionality. The BDS was founded in 2007 and became a legal entity in
2009 (with US$7 billion in subscribed capital, though recent reports suggest that the figure has
grown to US$10 billion).30 The BDS project moved forward in late November 2016 after a long
period during which it failed to advance beyond its legal existence. At a meeting at the
headquarters of the Union of South American Nations in Quito, an Executive Board was
installed (with representatives of Venezuela, Uruguay, Ecuador, and Bolivia). The Board
announced that the institution would begin its pre-operative phase, and that Uruguayan
economist Pedro Buonomo would be the bank’s first president (El Telégrafo 2016). The
announcement in 2016 that the BDS would nonetheless begin functioning was unexpected. It has
initial planned paid-in capital of US$90 million, and Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela are
reported to have paid in already. 31 Fundamental questions remain about where the institution’s
capital will come from, especially in light of the severe economic and political crisis in
Venezuela and leadership changes in Argentina and Brazil.
Governance, Surveillance, Conditionalities, and Institutional Linkages
Many of the institutions surveyed above are characterized by governance structures that
differentiate them from the BWIs, in which AEs (especially the US) have disproportionate
weight. Many of the institutions are organized to promote greater inclusiveness, though there is
quite considerable divergence in the degree to which this is achieved by design or in practice.
Indeed, some of the institutions considered here hew rather closely to the BWIs in terms of
governance (when it comes to the influence of countries that contribute a large portion of the
institution’s capital and the role of a resident board), whereas others have made a rather sharp
break with these norms. The fact that the institutions surveyed have diverse and complicated
decision-making structures reflects the necessary and real tensions between the demands of the
larger countries that provide the bulk of financial support, recognition of the legitimacy of
concerns about inclusiveness for smaller, poorer countries, and the complicated power politics
that necessarily infuses regional and trans-regional initiatives.
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Like governance, the matter of “getting conditionality right” continues to be a key
challenge, which institutions are managing in diverse ways. Some institutions, such as the
CMIM, CRA, ArMF, and FLAR, plan to or already do conduct surveillance (including country
missions) and utilize conditionality or require some type of adjustment program, at least under
certain circumstances. Others, such as the EFSD, require conditionality under all circumstances.
Some, such as the FLAR and CAF, employ an approach to monitoring that works with
borrowing governments in ways that are decidedly distinct from the top-down approach of the
BWIs. Here, surveillance (and in the case of FLAR) adjustment programs are minimalist, highly
country-specific, peer based, and exclude the BWIs. Some institutions are actively wrestling with
these issues and involve the IMF explicitly under certain circumstances (e.g., the CMIM and
CRA). In contrast, the EFSD involves the IMF implicitly through consultations and, like the
CRA, abstains from lending to countries in arrears to it. The early design of the BDS renounced
conditionality altogether. In the newest institutions, such as the AIIB and NDB, the matter of
project selection and assessment is still evolving, as is the issue of how to handle non-performing
loans.
For the most part, the institutions considered here are more agile than the BWIs (and the
MRDBs) inasmuch as they respond quickly to economic challenges in their field of operations.
In several instances, this agility—coupled, critically, with a sense of country ownership and the
appropriateness of surveillance procedures—has induced countries receiving support to treat the
lending institutions as if they held preferred creditor status.
An obstacle facing reserve pooling arrangements in particular concerns the challenges
posed by pre-cautionary forms of support. Some institutions, such as the CMIM, plan to utilize
pre-qualification criteria before support is disbursed. Others, such as the FLAR, have thus far
successfully used their own forms of monitoring and dialogue to determine eligibility for precautionary support without resorting to pre-qualification criteria. For the CRA the matter of
qualification for both liquidity and precautionary support remains under consideration among
member central banks, though at this point the CRA mirrors the link to the IMF that is a feature
of the CMIM.32 Precautionary support is always a complex matter, as we have seen in the case of
the IMF’s Flexible Credit Line (Grabel 2011). It often involves some sort of prequalification
criteria, which may mean that the candidates that meet the criteria are those that are least likely
to need support, and in the case of regional and transregional bodies, it may undermine the
solidarity that is an intrinsic part of these arrangements.
CONCLUSION
As the foregoing makes clear, the institutions surveyed do not meld into any sort of new,
coherent system of financial governance architecture or developmental finance. Not all are
equally likely to thrive in the years ahead. Neither individually nor collectively do any of the
reserve pooling institutions considered here promise or seek to challenge the IMF as the central
institution of crisis response. In the realm of development banks, the institutions considered here
should also not be considered against the standard of displacement of the World Bank or the
32

Disbursal criteria for both forms of support available from the CMIM and CRA are currently
under consideration.
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MRDBs. They do not amount to a new pole of financial power that will necessarily demote AE
hegemony in financial affairs. Instead, the initiatives are fragmentary and heterogeneous, some
are internally fraught with rivalry and suspicion, and many are no doubt marked by the same
kinds of ambiguity as the IMF, where gritty, muddled day-to-day practice conflicts with
coherent, pristine mission statements. Finally, the institutions may work at cross-purposes,
especially during crisis moments, undermining each other’s efforts and/or imposing cross-border
spillovers that disrupt each other’s economies.33
I do not take these features as fatal flaws. Instead, guided by Hirschman, I recognize the
present period of institutional experimentation, expansion, and hybridization as a moment of
pragmatic innovation that just might yield institutions and practices that do better than their
predecessors in promoting financial stability and resilience, and as a consequence of that,
provide at least the possibility for development that is more stable, inclusive, sustainable, and
protective of autonomy. With Hirschman, I place emphasis on the potential inherent in
unscripted adjustments that are freed from the constraints imposed by hegemonic narratives that
purport to demonstrate the single path to economic security and development.
At a minimum, the flourishing of heterogeneous EMDE institutions of financial
governance and developmental finance generates new opportunities for exit from unresponsive
institutions and for at least a degree of forum shopping among alternatives. As a consequence, it
may increase EMDE resilience, bargaining power, and voice vis-à-vis the BWIs (Helleiner
2010). To the extent that opportunities for forum shopping are realized, the BWIs may face
pressure to respond to long-held concerns by EMDEs. In any event, the leverage of larger
EMDEs in global and regional financial governance is certainly increasing as several of the
institutions surveyed here have come to play a more prominent role during the global crisis.
Redundancy and the networks of cooperation that are already emerging may increase overall
resilience. In this connection, I note that UNCTAD calls for “more diversified financial
systems,” by which is meant different institutions of different sizes and mandates (UNCTAD
2013, chap. 3), that Ocampo (2006b, chap. 1) has long called for a denser financial architecture,
and that Culpepper (1997) argues for the benefits of competitive pluralism (among multilateral
development banks) on the grounds that overlap and rivalry encourage innovation and
productivity. Multiple layers and increased density have the potential to yield productive
redundancy—which can reduce instability, contain and ameliorate crisis, and increase
opportunities to finance development. The emerging productive redundancy threatens the
apparent efficiency of the streamlined, top-down, centralized financial governance architecture
that characterized the neoliberal era, which promised efficiency but in fact generated
extraordinary risk and crisis contagion while starving most EMDEs of adequate developmental
finance.
There are no guarantees, of course, that the new opportunities afforded by institutional
innovation, exit, and voice will necessarily generate a more just economic landscape. The
increased aperture in financial governance may not survive as emerging powers attempt to assert
hegemony over other EMDEs. Would a financial governance architecture dominated by China,
33

More broadly it must be acknowledged that incoherence, redundancy, and pluripolarity may
entail risks of their own (see discussion in Grabel (2017b, chap. 8).
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say, necessarily provide greater breathing room in the long run for smaller, lower income
countries? But for now, at least, we should be attentive to the potential for progressive reform
that has emerged as a consequence of the increased policy space that the evolving, incoherent
system provides. Certainly in contrast to the neoliberal era, when financial governance
structures, practices, and ideology represented a suffocating obstacle to innovation and
experimentation, today’s leaders look out on a more heterogeneous landscape that may very well
prove to be much more congenial to unscripted, locally-appropriate initiatives.
The new initiatives provide Hirschmanian opportunities—for learning by doing and
learning from others, parallel experimentation, and providential problem solving that only comes
about as a consequence of the Hiding Hand. Progress happens often when obstacles are initially
underestimated so that new initiatives appear to be viable and when practitioners are then forced
to search for solutions that were previously unimaginable. The next crisis may very well propel
new initiatives and a deepening of embryonic institutions and partnerships that speak to
challenges that now appear irresolvable. Moreover, the proliferation of institutions, even if they
are not as credible, efficient, and experienced as the Bretton Woods and related institutions, is
vital to the creation of new networks within countries and across national borders that can
enhance indigenous and widely dispersed capacity in areas that are fundamental to economic
development. We should remember in this context that even experimental failures can and often
do leave in their wake vital linkages and knowledge that may be available for and enable
subsequent endeavors. In this vision, few successes and failures are final—they are more
typically steps along branching historical paths as actors seek to confront the challenges they
face. They are best able to do that, Hirschman also reminds us, when they are free to do so
unencumbered by theoretical visions and institutional monopolies that attempt to pre-narrate the
future. Ad hoc, pragmatic adjustments rather than a tightly constrained choreography—that is
what Hirschman put his faith in, messy though it may be. And that is what is just what is
emerging across the new financial governance architecture.
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Table 1. Chief Institutional Goals or Practices
Institution
or
Arrangement

Reserve
Pooling

CMIM
FLAR
ArMF
EFSD
CRA
CAF
NDB
AIIB & Belt
and Road
Initiative/
Silk Road
Fund
BNDES
CDB

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

Liquidity/ Precautionary Development,
Counter
Support
Project, or
cyclical
Infrastructure
Support
Finance
*
*
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
*
*
✓
✓
**
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓**
✓**

✓
✓

Notes: CMIM=Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation; FLAR=Latin American Reserve Fund; ArMF=Arab Monetary
Fund; EFSD=Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development; CRA=Contingent Reserve Arrangement;
CAF=Development Bank of Latin America (formerly Andean Development Corporation); NDB=New Development
Bank; AIIB=Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank; Belt and Road Initiative=One Belt, One Road Initiative;
BNDES=Brazil National Bank of Economic and Social Development; CDB=China Development Bank
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* Arrangement

established, but no drawings to date.
Provision of counter-cyclical support is not an explicit function of the institution, but some resources disbursed
during crises have counter-cyclical effects.
**

Source: Author analysis
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Table 2. Types of Change during the Global Crisis
Institution
or
Arrangement
CMIM
FLAR
ArMF
EFSD
CRA
CAF

Capacity
Expansion
✓
✓
✓

Hybridization

✓
✓
Created as hybrid

✓

Institutional
Creation

✓
✓

Project loans and “fast
disbursement and
contingent operations”
played a countercyclical role
✓
✓

NDB
AIIB & Belt and
Road Initiative/Silk
Road Fund
BNDES

✓

CDB

✓

Support played a
powerful countercyclical role
Support played a
powerful countercyclical role

Source: Author analysis
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